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"Pianos in the Woods": 
Emily Dickinson's Imaginative Vision 
Steven Schindler 
David Walker, Adviser 
May 1, 1980 
After the final no there comes a yes 
And on that yes the future world depends. 
No was the night. Yes is this present sun. 
If the rejected things, the things denied, 
Slid over the western cataract, yet one, 
One only, one thing that was firm, even 
No greater than a cricket's horn, no more 
Than a thought to be rehearsed all day, a speech 
Of the self that must sustain itself on speech, 
One thing remaining, infallible, would be 
Enough. Ah! douce campagna of that thing! 
Ah! douce campagna, honey in the heart, 
Green in the body, out of a petty phrase, 
Out of a thing believed, a thing affirmed: 
The form on the pillow humming while one sleeps,. 
The aureole above the hummi~g house ... 
It can never be satisfied, the mind, never. 
Wallace Stevens, "The Well Dressed Man 
With a Beard" 
Finding is the first Act 
The second, loss, 
Third, Expedition for 
The "Golden Fleece" 
Fourth, no Discovery--
Fifth, no Crew--
Finally, no Golden Fleece--
Jason--sham--too. 
In this emphatically skeptical poem, Emily Dickinson 
squarely connects with one of the central issues of romantic 
and modern literature: the individual's alienation from the 
world in which he lives. This ontological separation had 
its origins in modern thought in the philosophy of Descartes 
and Hobbes, and was invested with scientific certainty by 
the revelation of Newtonian physics. Materialism gave way 
to mechanism, and the universe was reduced to substance and 
motion; it was emptied of purpose and value, and was thus 
seen as separate from the vital world of private experience. 
Inheritors of this world-view, the Romantics turned to the 
unifying force of the imagination. Through the power of 
imaginative vision, they sought to heal the breach between 
subject and object, and find a meaningful connection between 
man and the universe. 
By engaging the external world imaginatively, the Ro-
mantics hoped to discover the "One Life" that they believed 
was in everything. The natural world was thought to be 
symbolic, the "signature" of a unified spiritual reality. 
Tn his essay, "Nature," Emerson observes: "Every natural fact 
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is a symbol of some spiritual fact. Every appearance in 
nature corresponds to some state of mind, and that state 
of the mind can only be described by presenting that natural 
appearance as its picture." Similarly, in a note to! the 
"Intimations Ode," Wordsworth writes, "I was often unable 
to think of external things as having external existence, 
and I communed with all that I saw as something apart from, 
but inherent, in my own immaterial nature." It was precisely 
this correspondence that Dickinson eschewed; she rejected 
any not-..ions of a transcendental order, and embraced the world 
as she learned to see it--a world moving and changing in the 
flux of time and experience. The universe was chaotic, 
and any theories of unity were merely egoistic projections 
of the human disposition to order experience. The "loss" of 
the "second act" is the loss of certitude that arises from 
the rejection of a homocentric, unified vision of the uni-
verse; and the "Expedition for/The 'I Golden Fleece'" is a 
quest for a poetry of perception that describes the mind 
engaging "things as they are.,,2 It is, in Robert Langbaum' s 
words, "a poetry dealing with the object and the eye on the. 
object.,,3 Viewed in this way, Emily Dickinson is a poet 
who shares some of the same concerns that form the discourse 
of much of Wallace Stevens' poetry. I will attempt to explore 
these ideas as they occur in Dickinson's poetry, using 
Stevens as an aide to understanding them. 
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One of the targets of Dickinson's skepticism is reli-
gious dogmatism--a "narcotic" that seeks to "still the Tooth/ 
That nibbles at the soul"(501). Religion is an''eclipse'' 
interposing between herself and reality. Describing her 
family to Thomas Higginson, she writes, "They are religious--
except me--and address an Eclipse, every morning--whom they 
call their 'Father'''(L.261).4 This ironic jab at the anth-
ropomorphic projection of "Father" that allows us to con-
ceptualize the unknown, is developed in her poetry: 
Those--dying then, 
Knew where they went--
They went to God's Right Hand--
That Hand is amputated now 
And God cannot be found--
(1551) 
Using the common metaphor of "God's Right Hand," and extending 
it to its logical and absurd extreme, the poet rejects both 
the rigid beliefs of religion and the stale patterns of lan-
guage that "eclipse" reality. 
Dickinson recognizes that as our awareness of disorder 
increases and becomes more threatening, our "Blessed rage 
for order"(CP, 130) gets stronger. But she persistently 
rejects the "avarice of the mind"(1682) that seeks to tame 
*-h e. 01 
the "Giants" of the unknown by "containing" 'i-t-. in its logic: 
Brief struggle for capacity 
The power to contain 
Is always as the contents 
But give a Giant room 
And you will lodge a Giant 
And not a smaller man 
( 1286) 
Dickinson was not unaware of the conflict that this posture 
raises for the poet who must conceptualize to express herself, 
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and who must "contain Giants" in a system of patterned lan-
guage. This paradox is dramatized in one of her most awe-
some poems: 
I felt a Funeral, in my Brain, 
And Mourners to and fro 
Kept treading--treading--till it seemed 
That Sense was breaking through--
And when they all were seated, 
A Service, like a Drum--
Kept beating--beating--till I thought 
My Mind was going numb--
And then I heard them lift a Box 
And creak across my Soul 
With those same Boots of Lead, again, 
Then Space--began to toll, 
As all the Heavens were a Bell, 
And Being, but an Ear, 
And I, and Silence, some strange Race 
Wrecked, solitary, here--
And then a Plank in Reason, broke, 
And I dropped down, and down--
And hit a World, at every plunge, 
And Finished knowing--then--
(280) 
Funerals are a source of comfort for mourners who must come 
to terms with death. Through this ritual we attempt to 
mitigate the force of one of the greatest unknowns we con-
front. But for the poet, the funeral is an imposition of 
reason, a false idea of order that does not comfort, but 
rather, is the source of unbearable pain. The central 
metaphor of the "Funeral" becomes analagous to "Reason" 
when we realize (in the last stanza) what "Sense" has 
finally broken through. The function of funerals is to im-
pose order on a terrifying experience, just as "reason" must 
-5-
construct a coherent picture of reality from a bombard-
ment of random sensations. 
But although funerals9 and) analogously, reason are 
a source of pain as they attempt to resist the pressures 
of reality, an escape from an ordering consciousness to 
a state of mere "Being" is just as frightening. Matter 
is no longer ordered in space. Substance is spatialized, 
and space is localized so "Space--began to toll,/As all 
the Heavens were a Bell." This conflation creates an alarming 
sense of vertigo. The absence of an ordering consciousness 
not only causes a loss of balance; it results in the end of 
"knowing" and of language. When all order breaks down, and 
"knowing" ends, the syntactical order of language disintegrates. 
The location of the last word, "then)' is ambiguous; it can 
can be placed either at the end of the preceding phrase or 
at the beginning of one that might follow, but without the 
familiar patterns of language we are unable to be sure. 
The ambiguous placement of "then" suggests that to 
have "Finished knowing" is both a beginning and an end. 
The terror of mere "Being" forces us to recognize that we 
cannot know the world immediately; instead, we begin to 
realize that the world we see is mediated through an ordering 
mind. There is a dichotomy, not a unity, of mind and matter. 
To live without acknowledging the externality of the natural 
world--its randomness) and its indifferentrand often un-
knowable qualities--is to live with "Funerals in our Brains." 
But to escape from an ordering consciousness is to experience 
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an unbearable sense of vertigo. Dickinson accepts this 
dichotomy, and explores the complex interaction between 
the mind and the external world in a poetry of perception. 
Any meaningful engagement of reality can only occur 
after we discard all false beliefs and the stale language 
that perpetuates them. Ironically, when we are able to 
penetrate the "eclipse" of dogma, we find there is no 
light; there is only an existential darkness. Dickinson's 
hero does not seek an "igpis fatuus"(1551) to provide light 
in a dark world; she accepts this darkness, and copes by 
adjusting her "Vision to the Dark": 
We grow accustomed to the Dark--
When Light is put away--
As when the Neighbor holds the Lamp 
To witness her Goodbye--
A Moment--We uncertain step 
For newness of the night--
Then--fit our Vision to the Dark--
And meet the Road--erect--
(419) 
Although we face initial uncertainties when we put away the 
\ 
"Light," we emerge with a fresh vision of the world, and 
are able to "meet the Road," to confront "things as they 
are'," as Stevens puts it in "The Man with the Blue Guitar." 
Stevens uses a similar metaphor to expresS the need to 
adopt a skeptical response to the false lights that inter-
pose between ourselves and reality: 
Throwaway the lightVs, the definitions, 
And say of what you see in the dark 
That it is this or that, 
But do not use the rotted names. 
(CP, 183) 
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Like Stevens' "Man with the Blue Guitar," Dickinson's hero 
cannot know "things exactly as they are"; that is Ita tune 
beyond us"(CP, 165). Even when we adjust our sight to "Mid-
night," we do not see perfectly--"Life steps almost straight." 
The human condition of not knowing "things exactly as 
they are" does not detract from the wonder of "things:as 
they ar~I--a universe that is beautiful without our pro-
jections of passion and purpose. This "Wonder" is a 
condition to be savored: "Wonder--is not precisely Knowingj 
And not precisely Knowing not--/A beautiful but bleak con-
dition/He has not lived who has not felt--"(13.31). This 
"beautiful but bleak condition" describes the poet who 




So preconcerted with itself--
So distant--to alarms--
An unconcern so sovereign 
To Universe, or me--
Infects my simple spirit 
With Taints of Majesty--
Till I take vaster attitudes--
And strut upon my stem--
Disdaining Men, and Oxygen, 
For Arrogance of them--
( 290) 
The speaker confronts the natural world in one of its most 
awesome and sublime moments. Like Stevens' autumn aurora 
(liThe Auroras of Autumn"), it is a perfect symbol for the 
ambiguity and evanescence of reality. It exists apart from 
us: it is "sovereign" and "unconcerned." But in contemplating 
it, we connect with it. The "Taints of Majesty" that "in-
fect" the speaker are a resultl\her discovery of the profound 
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beauty in "things as they are." These lights are not a 
symbol; they just are. Stevens describes the phenomenon 
in similar terms: 
So, then, these lights are not a spell of light, 
A saying out of a cloud, but innocence. 
An innocence of the earth and no false sign 
Or symbol of malice. 
(CP, 418) 
In a moment of transport, Dickinson's observer feels 
a sense of harmony with the blazing sky, and is able to 
transcend the mundane world of "Men and Oxygen." But 
this transcendence is transitory, a moment in the mind; 
she cannot ''strut upon her stem" too long: 
,My Splendors, are Menagerie--
But their Competeless Show 
Will entertain the Centuries 
When I, am long ago, 
An Island in dishonered Grass--
Whom none but Beetles--know. 
( 290) 
The poet is conscious that her mortality separates her from 
the universe, but that through her art, she will achieve a 
form of immortality. The splendors of her art, though not 
negligible, are small compared to the splendors of the sky. 
"Menagerie" is the perfect word to describe this: it rep-
resents the exotic creatures of the world, caged in the 
formal structure of poetry. She receives her inspiration 
from the evanescent colors of the sky, holds them together 
in her mind, and gives them form in her verse. Her poetry--
ThE. 
v like the scholar's single candle in "Auroras of Autumn"--
lJ 
pales in the "ArVtic effulgence t" but its "Competeless Show" 
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is not extinguished: 
~ The scholar of one candle sees 
An A~tic effulgence flaring on the frame 
Of everything he is. 
(CP, 417) 
Although Dickinson's skeptical posture drove her to 
examine "things as they are," conteJorary philosophy caused 
her to question her ability to apprehend reality in its 
naked state. Summarizing the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Bertrand Russell writes: 
According to Kant, the outer world causes only 
the matter of sensation, but our own mental ap-
paratus orders this matter in space and time, 
and supplies the concepts by means of which we 
understand experience. Things in themselves, 
which are the causes of our sensations, are 
unknowable; they are not in space and time, 
they are not substances, nor can they be des-
cribed by any of those other general concepts 
which Kant calls "categories." Space and time 
are sub j ective
5 
they are part of our apparatus 
of perception. 
In a letter to Higginson, Dickinson writes, "While my 
thought is undressed--I can make the distinctions, but 
when I put them in the Gown--they look alike, and numb" 
(L.261). This statement reveals a major poetic dilemma, 
and it implies something about the nature of perception 
that informs much of Dickinson's poetry. Taken on a literal 
level, she is expressing the frustrations of the poet who 
recognizes the problems of faithfully rendering the beauty 
of the phenomenal world, whose salient qualities are flux 
and evanescence, in a sy\em of patterned language: "You 
cannot fold a Flood--/And put it in a drawer" (530) . But 
implicit in this statement is a paradox that directs our 
attention to the problems of perception and poetic expression 
-10-
that Dickinson explores in her poetry: since we can neither 
see nor express a naked thought, we dress it in metaphor, 
and in doing so, impose our subjective process of cognition 
on the objective world, refracting its contours through our 
own minds. 
In one poem, Dickinson squarely confronts the process 
of perception and its epistemological implications: 
Perception of an object costs 
Precise the Object's loss--
Perception in itself a Gain 
Replying to its Price--
The Object Absolute--is nought--
Perception setsLit fair 
And then Upbraids a Perfectness 
That si tua te s so far-.-
(1°71) 
The poet concedes that we see the world through a subjective 
lens; thus, "the Object Absolute--is nought." The speaker 
is aware that the nature of perception is such that it 
prevents us from accurately mapping the contours of an 
objective landscape; but rather than lamenting her inability 
to apprehend the "Object Absolute," she celebrates "gain": 
her ability to be, in Stevens' words, the "single artificer 
of the world/In which she sings" (CP, 129). 
The poet does not choose sides in the epistemological 
,y' 
debate of wheter mind or matter is prior and creative; in-
stead she recognizes that it is the complexity of their 
interaction that forms the content of experience, and is 
the source of art. The phenomenal world alone is devoid 
of beauty without a human perceiver--it is "nought." But 
neither is the poem an egoistic rampage: it is through the 
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act of perception that we realize how unknowable the ex-
ternal world is, "situated so far" from our own minds. 
Perception and language are the forces that enable 
the poet to invigorate our sense of reality, cutting through 
the "eclipse" of the absolute labels we assign to the "objects" 
of our experience. These rigid qualities that resist change 
are represented in the poem as "absolute" and "perfectness." 
With linguistic precision, Dnckinson defrocks two mighty 
superlatives. The 'Object Absolute" is complete, whole, 
and not dependent on anything else (including the mind). 
"Absolute" bestows upon the "Object" a title with implicit, 
unlimited powers--an absolute ruler. But "nought" is another 
absolute--absolutely nothing. The juxtaposition creates a 
linguistic type of destructive interference. The "Object" 
remains "Absolute," but it is emptied of any meaning, and 
its royal posture appears silly and pompous. 
In the second instance, it is essential to notice 
Dickinson's idiosyncratic noun.;..form of the adjective "per-
fect." "Perfection" is the standard usage for something that 
contains the quality of "perfect." But "perfection" would 
be too solid to be upbraided, even by perception. "Upbraid 
Perfection" rings futile--the pest of perception nudging up 
against a mountain. But "a Perfectness" is a bit more pliant: 
the introduction of the indefinite article and the forced 
suffix, "ness," which sounds like a loose appendage because 
it cannot merge phonetically with its root~ detracts from 
its solidity. This quality of being more "perfectish" than 
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"perfect" makes it a more plausible object to be upbraided; 
it also carries a snide undertone so that, even before it is 
chided, it shares a pejorative affinity with the "Object 
Absolute"--a cold and sterile quality of the just-too-perfect. 
Like the "Wonder" that "is not precisely Knowing/And 
not precisely knowing not," our inability to apprehend reality 
directly is not a cause for despair; it is a charm: 
A Charm invests a face 
Imperfectly beheld--
The Lady dare not lift her Veil 
For fear it be dispelled--
But peers beyond her mask--
And wishes--and denies--
Lest Interview--annul a want 
That Image--satisfies--
(421) 
That all knowledge is inferential is a justification rather 
than an impediment for poetry. With all transcendental notions 
called into question, and our ability to know absolutely made 
suspect, the moment of specific experience becomes the only 
verity; in a moment of "vivid transparence" (as Stevens 
describes it, CP, 380), the imagination engages the "Object 
Absolute" and "sets it fair." This places primary importance 
on the imagination for providing this ideal union of the 
imagination and reality, but we recognize (with the speaker 
in 1071)\~ that this harmony is transitory, an "idea of or-
'" 
der," rather than an existential one. 
The primacy of the imagination is dramatized in the poem: 
Who goes to dine must take his Feast 
Or find the Banquet mean--
The Table is not laid without 
Till it is laid within. 
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For Pattern is the Mind bestowed 
That imitating her 
Our most ignoble Services 
Exhibit worthier. 
(1223) 
The human mind is obsessed with pattern. The natural world 
holds a random assortment of food for our feast; the 
imagination engages this disorder, perceives the possibilities 
of pattern, and gives them aesthetic form. This tremen-
dous discovery of "the possible" gives art a noble pur-
pose: "The gleam of an heroic Act/Such strange illumination/ 
The Possible's slow fuse is lit/BY the Imagination"(1687). The 
imagination is a source of pleasure--"arranging, deepening, 
and enchanting" (CP, 130) a disordered universe--as well as the 
seat of our power over nature. It is our "Vision" in the 
trdar~':; or, to use Stevens' phrase, it "helps us face the 
dumbfounding abyss/Between us and the object"(CP, 437). 
Dickinson explores the relationship between "us and 
the object" in another poem: 
The Outer--from the Inner 
Derives its Magnitude--
'Tis Duke, or Dwarf, according 
As is Central Mood--
The fine--unvarying Axis 
That regulates the Wheel--
Though Spokes--spin--more conspicuous 
And fling a dust--the while. 
(451) 
The speaker calls our attention to the distance between 
subject and object: the wheel of experience is in per-
petual motion, spinning, and indifferently flinging dust 
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on the observing intelligence. But the central metaphor 
also illustrates the complexity of experience, in which 
the human agent is both a part of, and separate from his 
scene. Although the "Inner" may enhance the "Outer," it 
does not function without reference to it: it depends on 
reality. 
The imagination does not master reality by projecting 
itself into it, but by abstracting from the "Outer" its 
fictional possibilities--the "Duke" and "Dwarf." These 
fictions are transitory, varying "As is the Central Mood." 
Like the poet's "Menagerie" in 290, these images illustrate 
the possibilities as well as the limitations of the imaginati~n~ 
they are exotic, but they are ~lso real. Stevens articulates 
this balance between the imagination and reality in his 
essay, "Three Academic Pieces".: 
The imagination is able to manipulate nature 
as by creating three legs and five arms but 
it is not able to create a totally new nature 
as, for instance, a new element with creatures 
indigenous thereto, their costumes and cuisines. 
Any discussion of level is a discussion of ba-
lance as well. Thus, a false exaggeration is 
a disturbing of She balance between reality and 
the imagination. ~ 
"Manipulation" is roughly equivalent to aesthetic perception. 
In the same essay, Stevens writes that in poetry, "we are 
not dealing with identity. Both in nature and in metaphor 
identity is the vanishing-point of resemblance."-s;r In her 
poetry of perception, Dickinson does not attempt to create 
r 
C-'r 
a picture of the world, but rather,Vhow we patch it together 
in our minds. This process is explored in "Delight is as 
the Flight": 
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Delight is as the flight--
Or in the Ratio of it, 
As the Schools would say--
The Rainbow's way--
A Skein 
Flung colored, after Rain, 
Would suit as bright, 
Except that flight 
Were Aliment--
"If it would last" 
I asked the East, 
When that Bent Stripe 
Struck up my childish 
Firmament--
And I, for glee, 
Took Rainbows, as the common way, 
And empty skies 
The Eccentricity--
And so with Lives--' 
And so with Butterflies--
Seen magic--through the fright 
That they will cheat the sight--
And Dower latitudes far on--
Some sudden morn--
Our portion--in the fashion--
Done--
(258) 
The separation of the "Inner" from the "Outer" world be-
gins in the first stanza which opens with the simile: -De-
light is as the flight." Readers who are familiar with 
Dickinson's "naming" poems will recognize an almost familiar 
syntactical form. "'Heaven'--is what I cannot reach! "(239) 
and "'Hope' is the thing with feathers--"(254) are typical 
opening lines of poems in which the speaker gives a per-
sonalized definition for an abstract term. She uses a 
simple and powerful construction in which an abstract noun 
that is already, by definition, colored by subjective.values, 
is reduced to the poet's own terms. This reduction, however, 
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is not to be found in the definition itself, which often 
contains an undefined object that suggests ambiguity (lithe 
thing with feathers"), but in the copula,· "is." This 
syntax implies a direct and logical connection between 
subject and predicate, while the content reminds us of the 
subjective nature of knowledge. The intrusion of the com-
parati ve adverb, "as'," in "Delight is as the flight" is felt 
as a deliberate hesitation of language and must have a measure 
of significance. 
Rewritten in Dickinson's "naming form," "Delight is the 
flight" would seem to make sense in the. context of the first 
stanza. Delight is not in the colors of the rainbow (lithe 
Skein/Flung colored, after Rain"), but rather, in its evan-
escence (tithe flight"). Indeed, if this were the sentiment 
to be expressed, the hypothetical revision would seem to 
make poetic sense; its form would make a closer, mimetic 
gesture toward "flight" than does the actual first line. 
What she does say, however, and what she means are organically 
linked through form. It might be paraphrased as, "Delight 
is neither in the colors of the rainbow, nor in its flight; 
but rather, in the ratio of its appearance to its disappearance." 
The form of her statement is actually that which we commonly 
use to express proportion in algebra: w is to x as y is to z. 
Considered this way, delight is something that is exclusively 
human: it is not merely the delight in nature's colors or 
its evanescence; delight is in the patterns that we perceive 
that may have their seeds in the external world, but have in 
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themselves, an existence apart from it. 
There is a direct analogy made between the rainbow 
and butterflies, and human beings; they are linked by 
their shared quality of impermanence that is the source 
of an elusive magic! 
And so with Lives--
And so with Butterflies--
Seen--magic--through the fright 
That they will cheat the sight--
And Dower latitudes far on--
Some sudden morn--
Our portion--in the fashion--
Done--
The analogy is strengthened by attributing human qualities 
to untpinking things which, lacking thought, malice, or 
benevolence) can neither "cheat" nor "dower." There is, 
however, a subtle irony working to undercut the analogy 
between subject and object. This is achieved through the 
rhythmic modulation that moves the stanza to the final 
word,"done." The first four lines communicate a spacious, 
almost "magical" feeling: the repetition of the first 
two lines, the word "magic" that is followed by a phrase 
that achieves its fullest expansion on the word "Dower" 
before taking off into "latitudes far on." In both its 
form and content, the passage expounds on the word "magic." 
But when we share in nature's evanescence, the result 
is less fanciful; maglc is a whimsical euphemism for death. 
The syntax breaks down, and the stanza drops off "suddenly," 
and then expires in three short, last breaths, on the final 
note of "done." 
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One critic writes of stevens' poetry, that "One 
necessity of individual being, then, is mortality, and 
another is subjectivity, for the mind is a specific of 
time as well as a specific of existence or point of 
identity from which all the world radiates."S "Delight 
is as the flight" addresses these two aspects of being. 
The speaker recognizes that "the magic" of life is pred-
icated on our ability to conceive of our own mortality. 
(Dickinson writes elsewhere, "That it will never come 
again/Is what makes life so sweet"(1741).) It is this 
conceiving self that is also the "point of identity" 
from which "all the world radiates"; her subjectivity is 
essential to the "magic": "Seen magic--through the fright/ 
That they will cheat the sight." The magic is dependent 
on the quality of the perceiving mind that filters 
visual sensations through a complex of emotions and then 
recognizes them as "magic"--a "magic" that exists within 
the boundaries of the mind. 
Again, Doggett's remarks are particularly apt for 
this poem which dramatizes that "the moment of consciousness, 
the unfolding event we call experience, including what 
we think and what we feel as well as what we see, is 
an infinitely complex realization of self and world.,,9 
With all the poem's emphasis on the self, it is crucial 
to note that this is a moment of specific experience. 
The first and last stanzas lack a situational matrix, 
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and, as I have shown, describe not the world, but the 
way the mind perceives it. But the second stanza achieves 
the balance between self and world by giving the poem 
an experiential referent. The second stanza shifts suddenly 
into the past tense, and a youthful version of the speaker 
addresses not rainbow~ but a specific "Bent Stripe." 
This locates the observations made in the first and last 
stanzas more specifically in time. The present tense 
becomes more than the language of an abstract discourse; 
it represents a specific time in the life of the speaker 
whose remarks are more clearly understood when we recognize 
that she is older and that her experience has changed 
the way she perceives the natural world. We can recognize 
the contrast between the spontaneous "glee" that the 
rainbows evoked for the child and the somber, reflective 
mood of the last stanza. The reader is able to observe 
this specific experience as it unfolds in the speaker's 
consciousness. We trace a progression from a seemingly 
abstract statement in the first stanza, to a specific 
observation in the second, and finally, to a moment of 
heightened consciousness when the speaker becomes more 
fully aware of the complex relationship between herself 
and the world. 
Dickinson achieved her mastery over the natural 
world through her mastery of language. Perhaps the 
greatest distinction we can make between her and her 
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contemporaries lies in her attitude toward language. 
10 Unlike Emerson, for whom words were "signs of facts," 
Dickinson found in language the facts themselves. 
Words were the source of the poet's power, allowing her 
to create new meaning. For her, like Stevens, "A poet's 
words are of things that do not exist without the words."ll 
Johnson's subject index in the Complete Poems lists 
sixteen poems in which Dickinson writes specifically 
about words. She states her claim for the hidden powers 
of language over our lives: 
Could mortal lip divine 
The undeveloped F~ght 
Of a delivered syllable 
'Twould crumble with the weight. 
(1409) 
She expresses a similar sentiment in a letter to Joseph 
Lyman: 
t"Je used to think, Joseph, when I was 
an unsifted girl and you so scholar-
ly that words were cheap and weak. 
Now I don't know of anything so mighty. 
There are [those] to which I lift my 
hat when I see them sitting prince-
like among their peers on the page. 
Sometimes I write one, and look at 
his outli~2s till he glows as no 
sapphire.-'-
;r. ;' .... u' :l 
As R;'Sewall nicely observes, Dickinson achieves in her 
poetry "the intensification, or concentration, of meaning 
in words until they glowed 'as no sapphire. ,"13 This 
"concentration of meaning" in words until they seem to 
create their own meaning characterizes most of Dickinson's 
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"naming poems." . I will examine one: 
"Heaven"--is what I cannot reach! 
The Apple on the Tree--
Provided it do hopeless--hang--
That--"heaven" is--to Me! 
The Color, on the Cruising Cloud--
The interdicted Land--




Enamored of the Conjuror--
That spurned us--Yesterday! 
(239) 
As in the other poems I've discussed, Dickinson makes 
the "gap" between subject and object distinct: the objects 
of the natural world are always one step beyond our "reach." 
The distance between the poet and the "conjuror" provides 
the tension in the poem; there is a "war," to use stevens' 
apt phrase, "between the mind and sky"(CP, 407), and the 
struggle for victory is the dynamic of the poem. This 
"war" begins in the first line. The syntax of the sen-
tence implies the poet's mastery; "heaven" is defined in 
her own terms. But the content of the line informs us 
that "heaven" lies beyond the poet's words. The poem 
unfolds, an extended analogy, ironically linking a variety 
of natural objects (that are characterized by their 
.... 
elusiveness vis-a-vis the poet) to the speaker's term, "heaven." 
The abundance of these objects reveals another tension: 
the poet uses the singular form of the verb "to be," 
contrasting the human ability and disposition to perceive 
the resemblances in an assortment of objects, and order 
-22-
them in symbolic language, with nature's randomness. 
The process of naming is that of perceiving resemblance, 
and it is through this process that the poet creates 
new meaning, ultimately mastering the natural world. 
Although the mind perceives harmony, the tension that 
the poet maintains between the tenor and vehicle of 
her extended metaphor,14 reminds us of the extent of 
artifice, and consequently, of the fictional nature of 
the harmony between subject and object. Without denying 
the externality of the natural world--its randomness and 
elusiveness--she celebrates the imagination's capacity 
to create order from chaos. 
In his article, "The Structure of Romantic Nature 
Imagery," W.K. Wimsatt describes a characteristic type 
of romantic metaphor which is very different from the 
type I have just described. He writes that romantic 
metaphor "makes less use of the central overt statements 
of similitude" in which "both tenor and vehicle are 
wrought in a parallel process.,,15 This is indicative 
of the difference between Dickinson's imaginative vision 
and that of the Romantics. While the Romantics sought 
an ideal union between man and the universe, Dickinson 
insisted on the distinction, and in doing so, she placed 
the locus of artistic creation in the mind of the artist: 
a mind that was dependent on nature, but that in the end, 
transcended it by creating its fictiohs out of the uniquely 
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human gift of language. 
"The Golden Fleece," the imaginative transformation 
of experience into artifice, was Dickinson's vision. 
To achieve this, she found it necessary to somehow live 
closer to experience. This forced her to call into question 
the dogmatic beliefs that interposed between her and reality. 
The belief in either a theistic or transcendental order 
f'-(>;""f.o 
was to har a projection of the human need toV6rder onto a uni-
verse that was forever fleeing, enamoring her with its 
evanescent beauty. Her skepticism resulted in a loss of 
certitude; it meant groping for a while in the "dark," 
searching for a new way to see. This is the position of 
"loss" from which her "expedition" begins. 
A corollary to this "religious" skepticism was the 
doubt raised by philosophers of our ability to apprehend 
the "object absolute." Our inability to participate 
in a state of mere being where "knowing" ends and "bells 
begin to toll" forced her to turn to the one thing she 
could believe in: the moment of perception when the imagin-
ation engages the world outside of it, "setting its 
objects fair," liberating them from a state of disorder 
by perceiving patterns and creating language. This is 
what the poet does; and much of Dickinson's poetry is 
about writing poetry. 
Dickinson loved a riddle, especially a tough one: 
-24-
The Riddle we can guess 
We speedily despise--
Not anything is stale so long 
As yesterday's surprise~-
(1222) 
For her readers, Dickinson bequeathed the ultimate riddle: 
1775 poems--moments of experience that often seem linked 
only by their ambiguities and contradictions. In reading 
her poetry we participate in our own "Expedition," trying to 
patch together a coherent pattern f~ her "competeless 
show. " 
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